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Abstract: This paper examines responses to questions on wage setting features in
Slovenia’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey in the institutional and
macroeconomic context of the Slovene economy. The question on collective wage
agreement did not capture the prevailing institutional arrangement of multi-level
agreements, and the responses on wage indexation were seemingly at odds with
institutional features of wage setting. Labor cost adjustments during the financial
crisis were primarily in variable pay components and employment but not in base
wages. Minimum wage policy contributed to downward wage rigidity.
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1 Introduction
Labor market institutions and wage setting mechanisms in euro area countries have re-
cently received considerable attention from the European System of Central Banks
(Eurosystem). In a monetary union, countries do not have the option of using ex-
change rate policy to respond to shocks and the importance of wage and labor market
flexibility as adjustment mechanisms becomes greater. If significant institutional rigidi-
ties are present, wage developments can perpetuate or exacerbate inflationary pres-
sures and render the task of macroeconomic stabilization yet more difficult.
Furthermore, if the rigidities are different across member countries, even common
shocks may lead to persistent differences in labor costs and associated changes in com-
petitiveness. Thus, a proper understanding of the features of labor market and wage ri-
gidities is essential for designing appropriate structural policies that will facilitate
adjustment to shocks.
With these considerations in mind, the Eurosystem established the Wage Dynamics
Network (WDN) research group in July 2006 to conduct an in-depth study of the
sources and features of wage and labor cost dynamics, and of the relationship between
wages, labor costs and prices both at the firm and macroeconomic level. Key elements
of this research were two questionnaire-based surveys conducted in late 2007/early
2008. One survey questionnaire, filled out by experts from national central banks in 23
European countries1, was aimed at collecting information on wage bargaining institu-
tions that prevailed in 2006 and a decade earlier in 19952. The second survey
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questionnaire sought information on wage and price-setting behavior at the firm level,
and was filled out by firms in 17 European countries. The harmonized questionnaire in-
cluded a common set of “core” questions for all countries, but some countries adapted
the questionnaire to account for specific country characteristics and differences in insti-
tutional framework by including fewer or additional “non-core” questions3. A third
follow-up WDN survey was conducted during the summer of 2009 in a sample of 10
countries to examine firms’ perception of the financial crisis and their actual responses
to it.
Ad hoc surveys typically have shortcomings. The most common limitations are a low
response rate and respondent bias (European Central Bank 2009a). The latter includes
recall error, lack of familiarity with the details, misunderstanding in interpreting the
questions, and being influenced by the specific macroeconomic environment prevailing
at the time of the survey. Therefore, it would be of interest to examine how well the
survey responses conform to known institutional features of wage setting and macro-
economic developments in the country. This issue has not received much attention in
the discussions of the WDN survey results. In this paper, we carry out such an exercise
based on responses to selected questions on features of wage setting in the 2008 WDN
firm-level survey for Slovenia. Slovenia did not participate in the follow-up 2009 WDN
survey.
This paper provides a description of wage setting institutions in Slovenia, places the
labor market outcomes in a broader macroeconomic context, and presents selected re-
sults of the 2008 firm-level WDN survey. The primary objective of the paper is to
check the survey results for consistency and signal potential caveats in its interpret-
ation, including with regard to downward real wage rigidity. An important conclusion
of the paper is that the WDN survey findings for Slovenia have to be interpreted with
care, owing to limitations in both the design of the survey questionnaire and its imple-
mentation in practice. The paper makes suggestions regarding the conduct of a follow-
up survey of Slovene firms, which would address some of the limitations of the 2008
survey and would also allow a better understanding of wage setting practices in differ-
ent phases of a business cycle.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the evolution of collective
bargaining and wage setting institutions in Slovenia. Section 3 discusses the developments
in GDP growth, inflation, labor productivity, and average wages during 1995–2010.
Section 4 reviews selected findings of the WDN survey and econometric analysis of
wage rigidity, against the backdrop of the discussion of wage-setting institutions and
macroeconomic developments. Section 5 concludes.
2 Some institutional features of wage setting
Analyses of labor market institutions typically examine, inter alia, union density, the
level of collective bargaining, the coverage of collective wage agreements, degree of
wage indexation, and developments in minimum wages. Researchers generally consider
centralization of wage bargaining and higher values of the other indicators as evidence
of less flexibility (e.g., see Deutsche Bundesbank 2009; Kézdi and Kónya 2009). In
Slovenia, some of the individual aspects of institutions have become more flexible over
time. However, one should be careful in drawing conclusions about the effect of this on
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macroeconomic performance. As Aidt & Tzannatos (2002) note, the impact of individ-
ual aspects such as union density or centralization of bargaining cannot be assessed in
isolation as it is the package of institutions that matters. In addition, the impact de-
pends on the prevailing economic, legal, and political environment and can vary over
time.
2.1 Trade union density
Trade union density in Slovenia has decreased since independence, though different data
sources disagree on the extent of the decline in recent years. According to European In-
dustrial Relations Observatory On-line (EIROnline) (2004, 2009a, 2009b), the percentage
of employees affiliated with a trade union decreased by about one third in the initial years
of Slovenia’s transition to a market-oriented economy from 63.5 percent in 1994 to
42.8 percent in 1998, and fluctuated between 40 and 44 percent thereafter4. In contrast,
the OECD data base shows a much lower level of union density and a large fall in recent
years. According to the OECD, union density in Slovenia fell from 37.5 percent in 2003 to
28.1 percent in 2008 and 25.6 percent in 2009 (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=UN_DEN) It is believed that union density declined further during 2010–
2011 as a result of the crisis-related rise in bankruptcies (European Industrial Relations
Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2013).
The decline in union density in Slovenia can be explained by the structural changes
in the economy during the transition process and run-up to euro adoption. Sectors
with traditionally high union density (e.g., mining, textiles, leather, and basic metals)
have undergone substantial downsizing, and employment growth has mainly taken
place in the services sectors where union representation is smaller and more difficult to
organize. In addition, the practice of hiring workers on fixed-term contracts or
recruiting temporary workers through employment agencies has become more preva-
lent5, and such workers have little incentive to join trade unions (European Industrial
Relations Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2010).
2.2 Level and coverage of collective bargaining
Notwithstanding a decrease in trade union density, virtually all employees in Slovenia
have been covered by collective agreements over the years. In 2007, 96 percent of em-
ployees were covered by collective agreements and the remaining 4 percent of em-
ployees, comprising of managerial workers, were covered by individual agreements
(European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2009b). Until 2005,
the extension procedure of collective agreements was based on “functional equivalent”,
in that because of compulsory membership of enterprises in the Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry the agreements were binding for all employers and their employees
(Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2004). Membership in
employers’ associations ceased to be compulsory from 2006, but the Collective Agree-
ments Act 2006 stipulated that sectoral agreements concluded by associations of em-
ployers would continue to be mandatory for all employers and their employees in the
sector for a transitional period of three years. Thereafter, the Act allows for the possi-
bility of extension of a sectoral collective agreement to all employers and employees in
the sector if the agreement was signed by representative trade unions and employers
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that employ at least 50 percent of all employees in the sector and one of the parties
seek an extension from the Minister of Labor (European Industrial Relations Observa-
tory On-line (EIROnline) 2009c); European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions (Eurofound) 2011)6. During 2009–2010, the Minister of Labor
granted extension to six sectoral collective bargaining agreements.
Wage bargaining in Slovenia in the private sector is highly structured and are negoti-
ated at three levels7. A general agreement at the national level determines the wage in-
dexation mechanism that is binding for the entire private sector, while sectoral and
enterprise-level agreements negotiate additional wage increases based on productivity
growth, financial performance, and other considerations. Agreements at each of the
lower levels normally improve on the provisions of the higher level agreements. How-
ever, the higher level agreements generally include escape clauses that allow enterprises
in financial distress to defer specified wage increases under certain conditions.
A move toward partial decentralization of the bargaining framework was initiated in
2006 but the changes did not fully go into effect immediately. The Collective Agree-
ment Act 2006 provided for collective agreements to be negotiated on a voluntary
basis, but the prevailing practice of full coverage of general and sectoral agreements
was to remain in effect for a three-year transitional period. Until 2005, the general
agreement at the national level was negotiated on a tripartite basis between the trade
unions, employers and government. From 2006 onward, the government stopped par-
ticipating in the negotiations. Collective bargaining at the sectoral level gained in im-
portance and became dominant. However, the social partners continued to negotiate a
general agreement on starting pay and minimum basic pay increases as well as inflation
safeguard clause that would apply to all workers in the private sector who were not
covered by sectoral collective agreements or whose sectoral collective agreement did
not determine the pay adjustment supplement. The sectoral agreements were required
by law to set terms at least as favorable as those in the general intersectoral
agreement8.
There has been no new general intersectoral collective agreement since the expiry of
the 2008–2009 general intersectoral collective agreement in December 2010, and all
pay-related issues for the private sector are being regulated by the Employment Rela-
tionship Act and sectoral collective agreements. In some sectors―especially the labor-
intensive ones like textiles, clothing, and leather industries―collective bargaining has
stopped altogether because of the adverse impact of the economic crisis. However,
wages in these sectors have been adjusted in line with the increase in the minimum
wage (European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2013).
Enterprise-level collective agreements always have been voluntary and are over and
above the provisions of general and sectoral agreements. Thus, enterprises have flexibil-
ity to react to enterprise-specific economic circumstances, subject to meeting the
norms set in the general and sectoral agreements. Enterprise-level agreements are more
common in large firms. According to employers’ associations, about 75–80 percent of
large enterprises, 20–50 percent of medium-sized enterprises and less than 10 percent
of small enterprises are covered by enterprise-level collective agreements9. The estimates
of trade union confederations are lower. The two largest trade union confederations
(ZSSS and KS − 90) estimate that 30–50 percent of large enterprises, 20–30 percent
of medium-sized enterprises and 5 percent of small enterprises are covered by
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enterprise-level collective bargaining (see Table twelve in European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) 2007). There are
no estimates on how enterprise-level collective agreements have evolved over time.
2.3 Indexation of wages to inflation
Adjustment of wages to inflation has been a key element of all general wage agreements
in Slovenia (Table 1). The indexation mechanism has been modified periodically to sup-
port disinflation during the transition process and run-up to euro adoption. During
1995–2000, the indexation mechanism was backward looking, with base wage increases
partially indexed to past inflation. In 2001, social partners agreed to the implementation
of a forward-looking indexation mechanism which provided for partial indexation of
base wage increases to the projected inflation rate and a safeguard for additional in-
crease in the event actual inflation turned out to be higher than projected. The index-
ation mechanism was further modified in 2004, coinciding with Slovenia’s membership
of the European Union and entry in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II in preparation
for euro adoption. The new indexation formula tied wage increases to projected infla-
tion in Slovenia, projected inflation in selected EU member states, and the projected
exchange rate of the tolar vis-à-vis the euro. The mechanism also included a safeguard
for additional wage increase in the event actual inflation exceeded a specified rate.
The general agreements reached by social partners in 2006 and 2008 without govern-
ment participation continued to link wage increases to inflation. Projected inflation was
taken into account in the determination of the increase in starting and minimum base
wages, though this was not transparent as the agreements proposed increases of a spe-
cified percentage each year. Both agreements also included a provision for additional
wage increases if inflation exceeded a specified rate.
The frequency of wage adjustments initially depended on the pace of inflation, but
has not varied in recent years. Adjustments were made quarterly during 1995–96 when
inflation was high. As inflation slowed down, adjustments were made once a year dur-
ing 1997–98. However, with the resurgence of inflation pressure in 1999 wage adjust-
ments began to be carried out twice a year and this frequency of adjustment continued
to be provided for in the wage agreements for subsequent years even after inflation
came down10.
2.4 Minimum wages
Minimum wage developments have contributed to downward wage rigidity in Slovenia.
Until 2006, the minimum wage was set within the framework of the tripartite agree-
ment between unions, employers and the government. Since then, the government has
been setting the minimum wage alone, following consultations with employers and
unions. During 2001–2004 and 2008–2010 the minimum wage went up by more than
the average wage in the private sector. Thus, the ratio of the minimum wage to the
average wage in the private sector has risen from 43 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in
2010, with a temporary dip during 2006–2007 (Figure 1). Following its increase in
March 2010, the minimum wage rather than the basic wage negotiated in sectoral col-
lective agreements became the binding wage-setting parameter for many workers in the
private sector, and there was a leveling out of wages at the bottom half of the wage
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Table 1 Slovenia: Wage policy under general/inter-sectoral collective agreements for
private sector employees
Date of
agreement
Type of agreement Features of wage agreement
1995 Social agreement Overall objective: maintain level of real wages.
Quarterly adjustment of base wages by 85%
of inflation in the previous quarter.
Additional increase in wages related to
productivity
Overall objective: maintain level of real
wages.
1996 Social agreement Overall objective: maintain level of real
wages.
Quarterly adjustment of base wages by
85% of inflation in the previous quarter.
Additional increase in wages related to
productivity.
1997, June Pay policy agreement for
1997 − 1999
Quarterly indexation of base wages
replaced by annual indexation.
Base wages to increase by 85% of inflation
in previous year.
1999 Agreement on Incomes
Policy for 1999 − 2001
1999 − 2000:
Adjustment of base wages in January by 85%
of inflation in previous year.
Additional increase in mid-1999 for price
impact of introduction of VAT.
Safeguard clause for additional increase in
mid-2000 in the event of higher-than-expected
inflation.
2001:
Gradual transition to forward-looking
indexation of base wages.
Base wages increased in July 2001 by 92.5% of
inflation in first half of year.
Base wages to increase in January 2002 by 90%
of projected inflation in second half of 2001
(equivalent to increase of 2.7%)
Safeguard clause for additional increase in the
event of higher-than-projected inflation.
2002, June Pay policy agreement for
2002 − 2003
Base wages to be adjusted two times a year,
based on projected inflation.
August 2002: Base wages to increase by 4.2%.
December 2002: Base wages to increase by amount
that inflation during January-November 2002
exceeds 4.2%.
August 2003: Base wages to increase by 2.5%
plus the amount that inflation during
January-June 2003 exceeds 2.6%. (The additional
increase to be triggered only if actual inflation
during January-June exceeds 2.8%).
December 2003: Base wages to increase by the
amount that inflation during January-November 2003
exceeds the wage increase awarded in August.
2004, April General collective agreement
for the private sector (GCAPS)
for 2004 − 2005
Increase in base wages to be determined by formula
incorporating forecast inflation in Slovenia, forecast
inflation in selected EU member states, and forecast
Banerjee et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies , : Page 6 of 23
http://www.izajoels.com/content///
2013, 2:9
.i j l .com/content 2/1/9
tariff scale. In 2010, the level of the minimum wage stood mostly at the level of the fifth
tariff class (the seventh tariff class in the textile sector) compared with the lowest basic
and starting wages set in collective bargaining agreements (Institute of Macroeconomic
Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2011). Prior to 2010, the minimum wage was bind-
ing for all sectoral collective agreements in the first tariff class. The share of minimum
wage recipients in total employment jumped from 2.8 percent in 2009 to 5.5 percent in
2010.
3 Macroeconomic background
Slovenia experienced a robust economic growth until the onset of the global financial
crisis in 2008. Real GDP growth fluctuated around an average of about 4 percent dur-
ing 1996–2005, rose sharply during 2006–07, and fell markedly thereafter (Figure 2).
Being a small open economy, Slovenia’s growth was highly sensitive to the external eco-
nomic environment. The periods of slowdown of economic growth coincided with un-
favorable external conditions. GDP growth was primarily driven by productivity growth
Table 1 Slovenia: Wage policy under general/inter-sectoral collective agreements for
private sector employees (Continued)
tolar-euro exchange rate. The formula resulted in
wage increases of 3.2% in 2004 and 2.7% in 2005.
Additional wage increase by the amount that actual
inflation in Slovenia exceeds 3.6% during
December 2003 − December 2004 and 2.9%
during December 2004 − December 2005.
All workers to receive minimum wage increase of SIT
5,000 in August 2004 and SIT 5,100 in August 2005.
Additional wage increases related to productivity
gains possible in sectoral collective agreements,
subject to the condition that overall real growth
in average wages should lag productivity growth
by at least one percentage point.
2005, September GCAPS Cancelled by Employers' Associations in anticipation
of new framework of collective agreements being
negotiated without government participation.
2006, June Inter-sectoral collective
agreement (CAMPA),
July 2006 − December 2007
Starting wage and minimum base wage to increase
by 2% in 2006 and in 2007.
Further increase in base wage in August 2007 by
the amount that actual inflation during
December 2005 − December 2006 exceeded
the forecast inflation rate of 2.3%.
Social partners can agree on higher than 2% wage
increase at the enterprise level, if justified by
productivity growth.
2008, May Intersectoral collective
agreement, 2008 − 2009
No further base wage increases in enterprises that
already increased base wage by ≥5.2% in 2007.
Enterprises which increased base wage by <5.2%
in 2007 to increase wages in May 2008 by difference
between actual wage increase and 5.2% threshold.
Starting and lowest base wage to to increase by
3.9% in August 2008 and 2.3% in August 2009.
Safeguard clause: Full adjustment in January 2009
for inflation exceeding 4.55% in 2008. Full adjustment
in January 2010 for inflation exceeding 2.7% in 2009.
Sources: EIROnline (various issues), Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) (2007a, 2007b).
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throughout, though the influence of employment growth on GDP growth picked up
during 2007–08.
Inflation followed a broad downward trend until 2006, but turned around in 2007–08
and came down sharply in 2009 as the impact of the global financial crisis began to be
felt. The pickup in inflation following euro adoption in 2007 was unanticipated. With
inflation having bottomed out at 2.5 percent in 2005–06, the Autumn 2006 official
forecast for annual average inflation in 2007 and 2008 was 2.7 percent and 2.5 percent
respectively (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2006).
However, actual inflation rose to 3.6 percent in 2007 and 5.7 percent in 2008, in part
reflecting faster-than-potential economic growth and an associated rising positive
output gap11.
Wage policy is generally considered to have facilitated the disinflation process in
Slovenia during the transition process and run-up to euro adoption in 2007 (Bole and
Mramor 2006; Banerjee and Shi 2010). As noted earlier, adjustments of basic wages to
inflation were always partial and the wage indexation formula was weakened from 2001
onward. However, for a complete picture one should focus on the total gross wage of a
worker rather than basic wage, and compare the dynamics of nominal and real total
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gross wage with that of productivity. The increase in the total gross wage of a worker
depends on the increase in basic wage, increases negotiated in sectoral and enterprise-level
collective agreements, and other increases based on promotions, individual performance,
and enterprise performance. Thus, the growth of total gross wage may exceed inflation.
Whether or not this adds to inflationary pressures depends on the trend in the growth of
unit labor costs (ULC).
As Figure 2 shows, nominal wage growth in the private sector in Slovenia exceeded
inflation in all years, implying a positive real wage growth. Real wage growth averaged
around 2 percent during 1997–2003 and around 3 percent during 2004–2007. The pace
slowed down with the onset of the financial crisis and reached a low of 1 percent in
2009, before recovering to the pre-crisis rate in 2010. A part of the nominal (and,
hence, real) wage growth during 2009–2010 reflected a “composition” effect of a
changed employment structure resulting from layoffs of workers with low educational
attainment and low wages. The layoffs of low-paid workers tend to statistically raise the
average wage level even if wages of workers who retain their jobs do not increase. It is
estimated that the “composition” effect accounted for 0.9 percentage points of the 1.8
percent increase in the average nominal wage in the private sector in 2009, and 0.5 per-
centage points of the 5.1 percent increase in the average nominal wage in 2010. A bulk
(3 percentage points) of the increase in average nominal wage in 2010 can be attributed
to the rise in the minimum wage. Excluding the “composition” effect and the impact of
the rise in the minimum wage, the remaining effects (0.9 percentage points in 2009 and
1.6 percentage points in 2010) point to a substantial slowdown in wage growth with
the onset of the economic crisis (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Develop-
ment (IMAD) 2011, 2012). In response to the deteriorating economic situation, em-
ployers cut back paid overtime work and reduced the amount of 13th-month payments
(European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2009b)12.
In contrast to the pattern in the pre-crisis years, real wage growth rose at a faster rate
than productivity growth in 2008–09. One should not immediately interpret the emer-
gence of a negative gap between productivity growth and wage growth as evidence of
wage rigidity during an economic downturn. When faced with a decline in demand,
employers have the option of cutting total labor costs through adjustments in wages as
well as employment. During the economic crisis, enterprises did reduce employment
but probably by less than what they might have had, if it were not for the measures that
were introduced by the Slovene government aimed at encouraging enterprises to keep
workers on their payroll. These measures included subsidies for shorter-hour work
schedule and for giving workers paid leave for a temporary period13. Because of the
anti-crisis measures to avoid redundancies, measured productivity declined sharply in
2009 and a large negative productivity-wage gap emerged.
In practically all general collective agreements, social partners had implicitly or expli-
citly agreed that real wage growth should lag behind productivity growth14. This guide-
line was abided by a margin of close to 1 percent or more in all years, except 2001 and
2008–09. Reflecting this, real ULC was on a declining trend until 2007, but rose appre-
ciably during 2008–09 (Figure 3). Nominal ULC was on a rising trend throughout. The
pace slowed progressively during 2002–05, but picked up sharply during 2007–09 on
account of both faster nominal wage growth and slower or negative productivity
growth.
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Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have hypothesized a humped-shaped relationship be-
tween wage bargaining systems and economic performance: that real wage growth is
lower under highly centralized (national level) and highly decentralized (firm level)
wage bargaining systems and higher under an intermediate (industry level) bargaining
system. As cited earlier in Section 2, the impact of individual aspect of degree of
bargaining cannot be assessed in isolation as it is the package of institutions that mat-
ters. Thus, it is difficult to assess the impact of the changes in the collective bargaining
mechanisms on real wage outcomes in Slovenia, given the multiple levels of bargaining
in operation, continued practice of extension of collective agreements to all workers,
shock of the economic crisis, adaptability of union-employer coordination to the crisis
situation, and downward wage rigidity imposed by minimum wage policy. The short
observation period does not allow us to carry out a meaningful multivariate analysis.
Further, Driffill (2006) notes that the empirical analysis of Calmfors and Driffill has
been criticized for having paid more attention to the level at which bargains were
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struck and less to the extent of coordination among participants to wage setting (which
seems to be an important consideration in Slovenia).
4 Selected findings of the Wage Dynamics Network survey
The WDN survey in Slovenia was conducted in January-February 2008, and the refer-
ence period was 200615. A sample of 3,000 non-agricultural private-sector enterprises
with 5 or more employees was selected from the Business Register of Slovenia using a
stratified sampling technique. The stratification was done by sector (two-digit NACE
classification) and firm size (less than 50 employees, 50–199 employees, and 200 em-
ployees or more). The selected firms were contacted by mail with instructions to fill
out a web-based questionnaire. Only 681 enterprises, or 22.7 percent of those that were
contacted, filled out the questionnaire. The response rate varied considerably across
sectors and firm-size groups. The proportion responding to the survey was lowest
among small-sized enterprises (16 percent) and among enterprises in tourism (12 per-
cent) and construction (13.5 percent). Thus, in order to adjust for the unequal prob-
ability of enterprises ending up in the final sample and to make the results applicable
to the entire population of workers, the survey responses were scaled by employment-
adjusted sampling weights.
The Slovenia survey conformed closely to the template provided by the WDN. It in-
cluded the core and optional questions of the WDN plus some questions that were spe-
cific to Slovenia and not included in the other national questionnaires. The questions
were qualitative and quantitative in nature and were aimed at obtaining an understand-
ing of the features of wage setting and price and wage dynamics. In particular, the sur-
vey included questions on the frequency of wage changes, time-dependence and
synchronization of wage changes, prevalence and features of indexation and adjustment
of wages to inflation, wage setting of new hires, downward wage rigidity, response of
wages to shocks, the synchronization of wage and price changes, and how wages feed
into prices. Unfortunately, the Slovenia questionnaire did not include a question relat-
ing to minimum wages. More details on the WDN survey in Slovenia and the question-
naire can be found in Sila and Jesenko (2011) and Vodopivec (2010).
The assessment of the survey responses in this paper is selective. In particular, we re-
view only the responses on collective agreement coverage, adjustment of base wages to
inflation, wage rigidity, and labor cost adjustment strategies. We do not discuss the sur-
vey responses related to behavior of wages of newly hired employees and to price and
wage dynamics.
4.1 Level of collective wage agreement
The question on the level of collective wage agreement was posed differently in the
Slovenia survey from that in the WDN survey in other countries and had a major
shortcoming. In other countries, the survey included two questions on this issue: if the
firm applied a collective wage agreement set outside the firm and, irrespective of the
answer to this question, if the firm applied a wage agreement signed at the firm level.
Thus, these surveys could capture collective agreements being applied at more than
one level. In contrast, the Slovenia survey only asked which level of collective
bargaining agreement was applied by the firm, and did not provide the option of
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recording multiple answers. Thus, the survey did not capture the application of more
than one level of agreement that we know from Section 2 was a standard feature of the
Slovene system. This shortcoming needs to be taken into account in interpreting the
responses to the question on the level of collective bargaining that applied.
According to the WDN survey, about one-fourth of non-agricultural private sector
employees in Slovenia were covered by firm-level collective agreements, slightly more
than one-half by sectoral collective agreements, and one-fifth by general collective
agreement (Table 2). Since we know from Section 2 that in the reference year 2006 (i) a
general agreement covered a small group of workers not covered by relevant sectoral
agreements for a variety of reasons, and (ii) firm-level collective agreements were vol-
untary and augmented the agreements at the general and sectoral levels, it seems rea-
sonable to infer that the response of the firms in the survey probably indicate the
lowest-level of collective agreement that they applied. However, because the survey did
not allow for multiple responses, we cannot accurately ascertain the importance of dif-
ferent levels of agreement from the survey responses and cannot unequivocally com-
pare the findings for Slovenia with those for other countries.
As Table 2 shows, there were significant differences between firm-size groups and
sectors in the application of different levels of collective agreement. Firm level wage
agreements were applied most frequently by firms with 200 or more workers and by
firms in the utilities sector. Firms in manufacturing and financial intermediation also
reported incidence of firm-level wage agreements above the national average. The ap-
plication of general level agreement was reported most frequently by firms employing
less than 50 workers and by firms in market services. The patterns by firm-size and
sectors were consistent with expectations and broadly in line with that observed in
some western European countries (see Deutsche Bundesbank 2009; European Industrial
Relations Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2009a; Montornès and Sauner-Leroy 2009).
Table 2 Slovenia: Level of collective wage agreement by firm size and sector (Percent in
each size group and sector)a
Level of agreement
General level Sector level Firm level Don't know Other Total
Firm size (number of employees)
5 to 19 44.1 40.9 9.5 2.0 3.5 100.0
20 to 49 37.7 42.6 17.4 - 2.4 100.0
50 to 199 9.5 76.6 13.9 - - 100.0
200 or more 7.6 52.1 38.6 - 1.7 100.0
All size groups 19.0 53.2 25.6 0.4 1.8 100.0
Sector
Manufacturing 7.1 60.7 29.5 0.2 2.5 100.0
Electricity, gas, water - 23.5 76.5 - - 100.0
Construction 25.3 51.0 20.7 1.0 2.1 100.0
Trade 11.0 68.6 18.8 0.2 1.4 100.0
Market services 41.3 32.5 24.2 0.7 1.4 100.0
Financial intermediation 4.1 66.4 29.5 - - 100.0
All sectors 19.0 53.2 25.6 0.4 1.8 100.0
a Figures are weighted by employment.
Source: Wage Dynamics Network survey.
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As noted earlier in Section 2, trade unions and employers’ associations also report that
firm-level agreements are most common in large firms and minimal in small firms.
Profit margins are generally higher for larger firms and firms in the utilities and finan-
cial intermediation sectors, which allow them greater flexibility in giving performance-
based compensation above the wage increases negotiated in the general and sectoral
agreements. Also, union density is likely to be lower in smaller firms and in the services
sector, which reduces the scope for sectoral agreements being applied by them.
4.2 Adjustment of base wages to inflation
The responses in the WDN survey to the question on whether firms had a policy of
adapting changes in base wages to inflation are seemingly inconsistent with the institu-
tional features of wage setting in Slovenia. As noted in Section 2, the general agreement
negotiated by social partners in 2006 (the reference period for the survey) for workers
in the private sector not covered by sectoral collective agreements provided for a infla-
tion safeguard clause, and the sectoral agreements were required by law to set terms at
least as favorable as those in the general agreement. Yet, as Table 3 shows, as much as
40 percent of the sample indicated that they did not apply inflation indexation policy to
adjust base wages. The proportion indicating no inflation-indexation policy was high
across all size groups and sectors, but was highest among firms with 50–199 workers
and in construction and trade. Strangely, these two sectors also reported the lowest in-
cidence of firm-level collective agreements.
While the survey responses reflect respondent bias, one can conjecture a few reasons
for the seeming inconsistency. First, it is possible that the base wages negotiated in the
sectoral agreements went up by more than the indexation amount suggested in the
Table 3 Slovenia: Policy of adjusting base wages to inflation by firm size and sector
(Percent in each size group and sector)a
Automatic Informal No inflation Total
Past
inflation
Expected
inflation
Past
inflation
Expected
inflation
indexation
policy
Firm size (number
of employees)
5 to 19 20.9 0.8 26.2 4.9 47.2 100
20 to 49 18.5 3.5 31.2 4.5 42.3 100
50 to 199 10.6 - 28.7 7.2 53.6 100
200 or more 25.3 4.2 35.6 4.6 30.3 100
All size groups 20.9 2.6 31.9 5.1 39.5 100
Sector
Manufacturing 18.5 3.7 37.4 4.3 36.2 100.0
Electricity, gas, water 61.6 - 9.2 8.4 20.8 100.0
Construction 7.9 3.0 36.1 4.9 48.2 100.0
Trade 22.8 1.8 22.0 5.7 47.7 100.0
Market services 24.8 0.5 32.9 6.1 35.7 100.0
Financial intermediation 36.3 11.3 15.4 2.5 34.5 100.0
All sectors 20.9 2.6 31.9 5.1 39.5 100.0
a Figures are weighted by employment.
Source: Wage Dynamics Network survey.
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general agreement. Second, it is possible that the respondents did not pay attention to
the fact that the question referred to base wages rather than total gross wages. Since
nominal total gross wages grew more rapidly than inflation because of reasons related
to productivity growth and other performance considerations, it is possible that the re-
spondents did not perceive inflation indexation as being relevant or binding for overall
wage determination. Third, the respondents may have misinterpreted the guidelines for
indexation in the general collective agreement. The safeguard clause for additional
wage increases in 2006 was not triggered because actual inflation in end-December was
less than projected16. Also, the general agreement for 2006–07 specified a particular
rate of wage increase without any explicit reference to indexation17, and the safeguard
clause related to inflation developments in 2006 was to take effect in 2007. Thus, these
two aspects could have mistakenly led some respondents to believe that indexation of
wages to inflation did not apply in 2006. Fourth, it may be that the respondents were
influenced by the fact that, unlike in earlier years, the indexation mechanism in 2006
was not government imposed.
Another striking finding of the WDN survey is that of those who indicated inflation
indexation of base wages a vast majority replied that wages were indexed to past infla-
tion. The pattern was similar across all size groups and sectors. Once again, this re-
sponse may have been influenced by the specific way that the indexation mechanism
operated in Slovenia. As noted in Section 2, Slovenia moved away from backward in-
dexation to forward-looking indexation in 2002, and agreements further included a
safeguard clause for additional increase if actual inflation exceeded the projected or
specified rate. The 2006 agreement did not explicitly include an indexation coefficient
and figure for projected inflation but had a safeguard clause. This may have influenced
respondents to interpret the framework as backward- looking indexation. It is difficult
to decipher why indexation was considered informal by a sizeable percentage of the
sample, because indexation was a key feature of collective agreements and there was a
formal rule.
The survey responses to the question on the typical frequency of base wage changes
due to inflation, shown in Table 4, is puzzling as well as seemingly inconsistent with
the institutional arrangements for indexation. First, the percentage of respondents stat-
ing that they never adjusted base wages due to inflation (16.5 percent, Table 4) is much
smaller than the percentage that claimed no inflation indexation policy (39.5 percent,
Table 3). Second, we know from the discussion of collective agreements in Section 2
that the typical frequency of wage indexation from 1999 onward was two times a year.
However, since the safeguard clause was not triggered in 2006, only one adjustment of
basic wages took place in August that year. Thus, it is odd that one third of the sample
claimed that base wages were adjusted to inflation once every two years or less fre-
quently than once every two years. Perhaps, the respondents were referring to the dur-
ation for which the negotiated agreements were valid. The proportion rose with firm
size (from 16.5 percent in firms with 5–19 workers to 41 percent in firms with 200 or
more workers), and was highest in the utilities and financial intermediation sectors
(about 48 percent in each).
Evidence of response errors is further demonstrated by the cross-tabulation of re-
sponses to the questions on inflation indexation policy and frequency of wage changes
due to inflation (Table 5). Of those who had indicated that they had an automatic or
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informal inflation indexation policy, 16 percent responded that that they had never ad-
justed wages due to inflation. Furthermore, of those who indicated that they had no in-
flation indexation policy, nearly 60 percent stated that they adjusted base wages due to
inflation once a year or more frequently. It may be that these firms did not see their ac-
tion as wage indexation as they did not follow the automatic indexation rule specified
in the collective agreement. Nevertheless, these seeming inconsistencies point to the
absence of proper cross-checks of the answers by the survey data compilers and to the
need for follow-up clarification of interpretation of the questions by the respondents.
4.3 Downward wage rigidity
The responses to the WDN survey questions aimed at assessing wage rigidity need to
be interpreted with caution18. An extremely small proportion of firms answered that
they had ever frozen or cut the base wages in the five years prior to the survey (below 3
percent in both cases). About three-fourths of the firms indicated that regulation or
collective bargaining was of little or no relevance in preventing base wage cuts. Rather,
the two most important reasons why base wage cuts were rare were the impact on
work morale and the possibility that the most productive workers would leave as a con-
sequence. In response to the questions about possible reactions of firms to possible de-
mand and supply shocks, no firm indicated wage cuts as the most important factor for
reducing costs. Furthermore, about two-thirds of the sample indicated that they had
never used any measure to reduce labor costs.
As such, these responses could be seen as evidence of high downward wage rigidity
in Slovenia but, when viewed against the economic climate during the five year refer-
ence window, we cannot take the survey responses as conclusive evidence. As Sila and
Jesenko (2011) point out, the observed downward nominal wage rigidity can be
Table 4 Slovenia: Frequency of adjustment of base wage to inflation by firm size and
sector (Percent in each size group and sector)a
More than
once a year
Once a year Once every
two years
Less frequently than
one every two years
Never Total
Firm size (number
of employees)
5 to 19 18.8 42.9 3.1 13.4 21.9 100.0
20 to 49 19.4 37.8 14.3 15.1 13.4 100.0
50 to 199 13.1 41.9 9.7 23.1 12.2 100.0
200 or more 14.3 27.9 15.4 25.6 16.7 100.0
All size groups 15.6 34.8 11.7 21.4 16.5 100.0
Sector
Manufacturing 19.8 32.7 12.6 22.6 12.3 100.0
Electricity, gas, water 9.2 42.9 17.6 30.3 - 100.0
Construction 22.2 39.4 7.8 15.3 15.3 100.0
Trade 12.9 46.7 3.7 20.4 16.4 100.0
Market services 10.0 26.5 18.1 20.7 24.7 100.0
Financial intermediation 6.8 33.2 9.5 38.0 12.6 100.0
All sectors 15.6 34.8 11.7 21.4 16.5 100.0
a Figures are weighted by employment.
Source: Wage Dynamics Network survey.
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explained by the absence of a business cycle downturn during the reference period.
The WDN survey was conducted prior to the onset of the financial crisis and, as
discussed in Section 3, the Slovene economy experienced robust GDP and productivity
growth and a U-shaped inflation path during 2003–2007. Thus, there was little incen-
tive for cutting or freezing base wages or, for that matter, total gross wages during this
period. While base wages were partially indexed to inflation under general collective
agreements, additional wage increases were negotiated in sectoral and firm-level col-
lective agreements based on productivity and performance considerations. Indeed, as
Figure 4 shows, reflecting the favorable economic trends, the proportion of private sec-
tor employees who received performance-related payments (“thirteenth month’s pay”
and Christmas bonus) increased from 20.6 percent in 2003 to a peak of 33 percent in
200719. Had employers made efforts to cut base wages or total gross wages in this en-
vironment, they would likely have lost their most productive workers.
When faced with falling demand shock during the financial crisis, Slovene firms
displayed flexibility in cutting labor costs to a significant degree. The adjustments were
primarily in variable pay components and employment but not in base wages,
Table 5 Slovenia: Inflation indexation policy and frequency of adjustment of base wages
to inflation (Percent frequency of adjustment in each indexation policy category)a
Automatic Informal All categories
of inflation
indexation
policy
No inflation
indexation
policy
Past
inflation
Expected
inflation
Past
inflation
Expected
inflation
More than once a year 13.7 31.2 17.5 22.1 17.2 13.2
Once a year 23.8 33.4 29.4 31.0 27.8 45.5
Once every two years 13.8 1.4 17.7 1.1 14.2 7.8
Less frequently than
once every two years
21.0 32.4 24.6 40.4 25.0 15.9
Never 27.8 1.7 10.8 5.5 15.8 17.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Figures are weighted by employment.
Source: Wage Dynamics Network survey.
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Figure 4 Slovenia: incidence of performance-related bonus payments.
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consistent with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements and the con-
straint imposed by the level of the minimum wage. The proportion of private sector
employees who received performance-related payments fell to about 26 percent in
2010—a decrease of nearly one-fifth from the 2007 level—and the average amounts of
the payments were smaller. Because of the existence of flexible wage components, firms
could manipulate these payments to lower total nominal gross wage without cutting
base wages. In addition to cutting performance related wage payments, Slovene firms
cut labor costs by reducing unpaid overtime work, placing workers on shorter-time
work schedules, and laying off fixed-term and temporary workers20. Enterprise level
collective agreements typically include the possibility of introducing shorter-hour work
schedule. As noted earlier in footnote 13 in Section 3, private sector employment was
cut back by 7.25 percent and another 12.7 percent of employees placed on shorter-time
work schedules in 2009–2010.
Supporting evidence on the prevalence of flexible wage components in the form of
performance-related bonus payments is provided by the WDN survey. As Table 6
shows, on average about 17.5 percent of the total wage bill in Slovene firms in the sur-
vey reference period (i.e., 2006) was allocated to bonuses associated with individual or
company performance. Bonus payments were more important in small-sized firms, and
in construction and trade sectors. The average share of both individual and company
performance-related bonuses in the total wage bill was highest among firms employing
5 to 19 workers and fell as firm size increased. Firms in the trade sector paid bonuses
related to both individual and company performance, whereas the construction sector
tended to rely mainly on bonus payments related to individual performance.
Following Babecký et al. (2009, 2012), Sila and Jesenko (2011) treat indexation of base
wages to inflation as a proxy for real wage rigidity and carry out an econometric exer-
cise relating this variable to selected firm characteristics21. In the specifications for the
Table 6 Share of total wage bill comprised of bonuses related to individual and
company performance by size and sector (Employment-weighted average share in each
size group and sector, in percent)
Firm size (number
of employees)
Individual performance
related bonus
Company performance
related bonus
5 to 19 12.0 10.0
20 to 49 11.3 9.0
50 to 199 11.1 5.8
200 or more 9.3 5.9
All size groups 10.4 7.1
Sector
Manufacturing 8.1 5.3
Electricity, gas, water 4.1 7.5
Construction 11.9 4.5
Trade 15.9 11.3
Market services 9.6 7.3
Financial intermediation 8.9 9.7
All sectors 10.4 7.1
Source: Wage Dynamics Network survey.
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sample of euro zone countries, Sila and Jesenko find that after controlling for other
firm characteristics, GDP growth and inflation, Slovenia had the highest probability of
firms reporting indexation of base wages to inflation. In the specification restricted to
Slovene firms, the probability of reporting base wage indexation is higher for firms with
higher share of high-skilled blue-collar workers and for large firms. Also, contrary to
expectations, the probability of reporting wage indexation is lower for firms with a
non-firm level collective agreement compared to firms with a firm-level agreement.
The results of the econometric exercise is best seen as multivariate determinants of
the response to the question on whether the enterprise had a policy to adapt changes
in base wages to inflation22, rather than determinants of real wage rigidity. As noted in
the previous section, the answers to this question were subject to serious response
error, taking into account institutional arrangements for wage indexation in Slovenia as
well as the WDN survey responses regarding the frequency of wage adjustments to in-
flation. General collective agreements covered all private sector employees in Slovenia
for indexation of base wages to inflation. If all the survey responses were consistent
with this institutional feature, the econometric exercise would be redundant because of
lack of variability in the dependent variable. Still, wage indexation per se should not be
taken as evidence of downward real wage rigidity. In Slovenia, the indexation of base
wage to inflation was partial, thus allowing for a decrease in base wages in real terms in
all years. The growth of total gross wages exceeded inflation because of additional wage
increases linked to productivity gains and performance, and there was variation in an-
nual developments in real gross wages.
5 Conclusions
An important conclusion of this paper is that the WDN survey findings on wage-
setting behavior of firms have to be interpreted with caution and should not be used to
draw definite conclusions about wage flexibility in Slovenia. The survey had critical
shortcomings: the response rate was very low, the design of some key questions did not
capture the prevailing institutional arrangements, questions may have been interpreted
differently by different respondents, and answers to some questions were mutually in-
consistent which suggested response errors and lack of proper cross-check by the sur-
vey administrators. In addition, it is likely that the survey responses were influenced by
the prevailing economic environment. The survey was conducted at a time when the
economy was booming and Slovenia had not experienced a downturn in the business
cycle during the preceding decade.
Evidence indicates that a sizeable part of the enterprise wage bill comprises of per-
formance related bonus payments that tend to be pro-cyclical in nature. In the years
preceding the onset of the financial crisis, the proportion of private sector employees
receiving performance-related payments was on an upward trend. However, faced with
falling demand shock with the onset of the financial crisis in late-2008, Slovene firms
displayed flexibility in cutting labor costs to a significant degree. Enterprises cut back
on performance-related payments in terms of amounts as well as the number of em-
ployees receiving them, lowered paid overtime work, put employees on shorter-hours
work schedule, and laid-off workers. The labor cost adjustment methods implemented
by the enterprises were within the bounds of the collective wage bargaining
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arrangements and did not involve cuts in base wages. A cut in base wages was not an
option following the large increase in the minimum wage in 2010, as the increase
pushed the minimum wage well above the basic wages negotiated in some sectoral
agreements, even for more demanding tasks. The government’s minimum wage policy
contributed to downward wage rigidity and worked against the other efforts aimed at
fostering wage flexibility.
A number of steps have been taken in recent years to increase wage and labor market
flexibility in Slovenia, though their impact is yet to be fully felt and many challenges re-
main. The Collective Agreement Act 2006 provided for collective agreements to be ne-
gotiated on a voluntary basis and the changes were to go into effect after a three-year
transition period. Thus, a decrease in the proportion of employees covered by collective
bargaining can be expected over time. The Employment Relationship Act was amended
in 2007 with the aim of expanding the possibility of using flexible forms of employment
(fixed-term employment), allowing for longer overtime work, and making termination
of employment contracts easier (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Develop-
ment (IMAD) 2008).
Looking ahead, there is a need to examine how enterprises have adapted to the
changes in the institutional aspects of wage-setting and employment relationships, and
to conduct in-depth micro data-based analysis of the enterprise behavior prior to the
crisis, during the crisis, and after the crisis. Unlike many other European countries,
Slovenia did not participate in the follow-up WDN survey that was conducted in 2009
soon after the start of the financial crisis. Thus, a follow-up WDN style survey that
takes into account the lessons from the 2008 survey and other follow-up surveys
conducted elsewhere is desirable. It would be particularly important in the follow up
survey to include questions on the role of the minimum wage in the setting of basic
wages in sectoral collective agreements and its impact on the labor cost adjustment ef-
forts of enterprises. For a comprehensive assessment of enterprise behavior and labor
market outcomes, it is not sufficient to focus on existing firms. It would be worthwhile
supplementing the survey for existing firms with a small survey of firms that have
ceased operations in recent years.
Endnotes
1 The sample also included Japan and the United States.
2 The main findings are reported in Du Caju et al. (2008).
3 See European Central Bank (2009a, b) for the main findings of the-firm level sur-
veys. Detailed analyses of the firm-level surveys can be found in numerous WDN pa-
pers, which are cited in European Central Bank (2009b). Four of these papers appear in
Labour Economics 19 (5), 2012.
4 EIROnline reports union density of 41.3 percent in 2003 (European Industrial Rela-
tions Observatory On-line (EIROnline) 2004), 44 percent in 2007 (2009b), and approxi-
mately 40 percent in 2008 (2009a, 2010).
5 In 2007, the share of temporary employment in total employment stood at 18.4 per-
cent (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2008).
6 Union confederations at the national level are deemed representative if their mem-
bers cover at least 10 percent of the employees in the industries, businesses or
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professions. Unions are deemed representative in an industry, business or profession if
they are either affiliated to a union confederation or cover at least 15 percent of the
employees in an industry, business or profession.
7 Given the focus of the paper, we do not discuss collective bargaining mechanisms
in the public sector. See Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development
(IMAD) (2007b) for discussion of collective agreements in the public sector.
8 The general agreement was used explicitly as a reference point in many sectoral col-
lective agreements (e.g. the collective agreement for retail and wholesale trade). How-
ever, some collective agreements did not make any reference to the general collective
agreement but provided terms at least as favorable (e.g., the collective agreement for
the metal industries).
9 Enterprises with 250 or more employees are classified as large enterprises, those
with 50 to 249 employees are classified as medium-sized enterprises, and those with
less than 50 employees are classified as small enterprises.
10 Adjustment in August for expected inflation, and additional adjustment made in
January if inflation exceeds forecast.
11 See Surti (2010) for a detailed analysis of inflation in Slovenia in 2007–08.
12 The number of paid hours for overtime work plunged by 44.3 percent in 2009.
The share of overtime work in private sector wages was about 1.5 percent in 2008 and
fell to 0.9 percent in 2009 (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development
(IMAD) 2011).
13 When the crisis hit Slovenia in the fourth quarter of 2008, the first reaction of
companies was not to renew fixed-term contracts and to reduce other forms of flexible
employment (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2009). A
newspaper article (Delo, March 31, 2009) quoted a statement by the Minister of Labor,
Family and Social Affairs that 6,000–7,000 jobs had been saved by the subsidy scheme to
support shorter-hour work schedule. In 2009 and 2010, about 65,800 employed persons
in 904 enterprises (accounting for 12.7 percent of employed workers and 1.6 percent of
enterprises) were beneficiaries of the subsidy scheme for short-time work. Partial reim-
bursement to support paid leave for temporary period was provided to 946 enterprises for
about 25,100 employed persons (accounting for 1.6 percent of enterprises and 3.8 percent
of employed persons). In the total number of recipients for both subsidies, the largest pro-
portion was in manufacturing enterprises (44 percent), followed by trade enterprises (18
percent). Within manufacturing activities, the metal industry included the largest share of
its employees in the two schemes. Notwithstanding the anti-crisis measures, total em-
ployment in the private sector fell by 7.25 percent in the two-year period 2009–2010
(Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2011).
14 To facilitate meeting the Maastricht inflation criterion under ERM II, the general
collective agreement for 2004–05 explicitly set down a guideline that real wage in-
creases should lag productivity growth by at least 1 percentage point.
15 Slovenia did not participate in the follow-up WDN survey conducted in 2009.
16 As noted in Table 1, the general collective agreement for 2004–05 provided for
additional wage increases in 2006 if inflation at end-December 2005 exceeded 2.9 per-
cent. However, actual inflation at end-December 2005 was 2.3 percent.
17 However, as noted in Section 2, projected inflation was taken into account by so-
cial partners in the determination of the specified rate of wage increase.
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18 See Sila and Jesenko (2011) for a detailed analysis of the WDN survey evidence on
downward wage rigidity in Slovenia.
19 In 2006, the percentage of employees receiving performance-related bonus was
highest in the utilities sector and financial intermediation (around 90 percent), and
lowest in construction, distributive trades, and hotels and restaurants (below 20 percent)
(Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development (IMAD) 2007a).
20 European Commission (2009) and OECD (2009) discuss and analyze the behavior
of firms and discretionary changes in labor market policy in the EU and OECD coun-
tries in response to the economic downturn. The developments in Slovenia noted here
are consistent with the cross-country finding of Bertola et al. (2012) that firms covered
by collective wage agreements seeking to lower costs are more likely to do so by redu-
cing the number of temporary employees than by reducing wages. European Central
Bank (2009b) report that according to the 2009 follow-up survey the incidence of nom-
inal wage freeze increased significantly during the financial crisis but the incidence of
base wage cuts hardly increased. On this basis, the ECB concludes that downward wage
rigidity was still prevalent in most European countries in the summer of 2009.
21 Babecký et al. treat automatic indexation of base wages to inflation as a proxy for
real wage rigidity, while Sila and Jesenko treat all manners of indexation of base wages
to inflation (i.e., automatic as well as informal) as a proxy for real wage rigidity.
22 Sila and Jesenko (2011) make an important contribution in this regard.
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